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08. Aug 2006

Hvorfor vi ikke skal være bange for terrorisme

 
Hvorfor skal vi ikke være bange for terrorangreb?

Fordi de sker yderst sjældent, fordi risikoen for at blive udsat for ét ikke er meget større end risikoen for at blive ramt af lynet - selv i de mest plagede lande er risikoen for at blive ramt af terrorangreb mindre end for at blive dræbt i trafikken.

John Mueller fra Ohio State University har skrevet en grundig artikel om sagen for den konservative amerikanske tænketank Cato Institute, hvor han påviser, at offentlighedens fokus på og frygt for terror som den store trussel er blæst ud af enhver proportion og desuden i en forstand en slags knæfald for terroristerne:
Frantz Fanon, the 20th century revolutionary, contended that "the aim of terrorism is to terrify." If that is so, terrorists can be defeated simply by not becoming terrified — that is, anything that enhances fear effectively gives in to them.
Truslen fra terrorhandlinger bør med andre ord ikke undervurderes men netop vurderes ud fra den størrelse, problemet faktisk udgør, ikke ud fra en hysterisk oppisket stemning, men som det ret begrænsede problem, det faktisk er:
Thus far at least, terrorism is a rather rare and — in appropriate, comparative context — not a very destructive phenomenon. However, the enormous sums of money being spent to deal with the threat have in part been diverted from other, possibly more worthy, endeavors. The annual budget for the Department of Homeland Security, for example, now tops $30 billion, while state and local governments spend additional billions. Some of that money doubtless would have been spent on similar ventures under earlier budgets, and much of it likely has wider benefits than simply securing the country against a rather limited threat. But much of it, as well, has very likely been pulled away from more beneficial uses. Accordingly, three key issues, set out by risk analyst Howard Kunreuther, require careful discussion but do not seem ever to get it:
  • How much should we be willing to pay for a small reduction in probabilities that are already extremely low?
  • How much should we be willing to pay for actions that are primarily reassuring but do little to change the actual risk?
  • How can measures such as strengthening the public health system, which provide much broader benefits than those against terrorism, get the attention they deserve?
Et tillægsspørgsmål kunne være: Hvorfor skal vi acceptere at få vore borgerrettigheder udhulet og vores retssikkerhed undergravet af "terrorlove" for at forholde os til en fare, der for den enkelte er noget mindre end risikoen for at blive ramt af lynet, for slet ikke at tale om risikoen ved at køre cykel eller vil? Der er lissom et eller andet, der ikke hænger sammen her.

Men læs endelig hele artiklen - den kommer ret godt omkring det.

Via Boing Boing.

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