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28. Feb 2006

Sejr i sigte - desværre ikke

 
Citizen Dane citerer en ret lang kommentar på IntelDump om USAs muligheder for at "vinde" i Irak og det totalt forfejlede i den nuværende strategi:
Rummy said that you go to war with the Army that you have, not the one you wish you had. That said, we have been on the ground inside Iraq, fighting, for two years 11 months - it took less than four to fight and win world war two. Geez, I am pretty sure we didn't invade Europe and destroy the Empire of Japan with the Army we had in Dec. 1941, and sure as hell not the Army we had in 1940. In 1940 we had an Army the size of Luxembourg's military, using WWI rifles or WOODEN STICKS for training, and three years later we had one of the best equipped, best trained, and largest militaries in the history of the world - and by 1945 we had 8 million men under arms and had equipped not only our military, but much of the rest of the world, with the some of the best equipment in the world.

But our soldiers still don't have what they need. No, I am not talking about equipment. I am not talking about body armor or up-armored humvees or stuff like that. We are missing the most important element for victory - a winning strategy. We had that before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Almost three years in to this war and we still haven't done the hard work of sitting down and figuring out where we are, where we want to be, how to get there, and then communicate that to the American people. Three f'ing years and even today just questioning the lack of a plan is called "comforting the enemy" or "harms the morale of the troops".
(...)
If we were serious about winning this war we would take the time and the money to give each soldier training in Arabic language and culture, and specifically Iraqi history. We would add weeks of training to initial entry training, but make it Iraq-specific. It would take billions of dollars and make our manpower shortages greater in the short-term, but it is what it will take to win in Iraq. Instead we see only multi-billion dollar weapons that will make contractors rich.
(...)
I think we can win in Iraq. We must. The inaptly-named "insurgency" is actually the former rulers of Iraq trying to reassert themselves and take over again. It is the powers-that-were, not some "insurgency" or Islamic fundamentalist movement. We are still fighting Saddam's military, not Al Queda. And it looks as if we are going to let Saddam's guys win, all because the administration refuses to admit the truth, even to itself.
J.D. Henderson, som skriver dette, søger altså efter strategier, som kan vinde krigen mod den væbnede modstand, fordi det, som han ser det, i sidste ende vil være det bedste for den irakiske befolkning.

Om ikke andet må man give ham ret i, at USA står med en betydelig moralsk forpligtelse i Irak. For Henderson repræsenterer den nuværende amerikanske kurs i Irak ikke engang et forsøg på at vinde, men på at undgå at stå med ansvaret, når man engang taber:
We didn't have a plan for success in March 2003 (which the Army knew and tried to raise hell about, but after Shinseki was fired and the Iraqi military collapsed the wise counsel of our senior military leaders was ignored). We don't have a plan for success now. We have only a plan to not pull out now - but yeah, maybe later. What a plan.

So we are apparently going to "stay the course." It is a successful strategy - if your goal is not to win in Iraq, but instead not to lose during this administration and set it up so that when we do lose you blame the critics instead of yourself. Pretty smart strategy, actually.
Men hvad skulle der så, stadig i Hendersons øjne, til for at vinde? Vel, han fremmaner billedet af en meget betydelig indsats med stor vægt på kulturel indsigt og reel hensyntagen til den irakiske befolkning:
We have a QDR that doesn't even address the issues behind what it will take to win in Iraq. We have no emphasis on language or cultural training or Iraqi history - especially a factual, honest look at the barbaric history of colonialism there. Sure, we train 300 soldiers here, 50 officers are taught Arabic there, but that is not the kind of program I mean. I mean 100,000 soldiers trained to speak Arabic fluently, 500,000 more who have less extensive - but still intense -language training and cultural training, and all soldiers (ALL) to recieve at least three weeks of an "Iraq" cram session so that they know WHY they shouldn't call Iraqis "hajis," so each and every commander knows why kicking in doors, even when it must be done, is a step in the direction of losing this war, so each and every soldier knows WHY we must give up our palaces and move out of our fortified bases and back into Iraq, amongst the people - even when our casualties will initially skyrocket. You can't win a war by sitting in a bunker - doesn't matter what kind of war it is. This training will cost billions and billions of dollars, and it won't help us do anything other than win in Iraq.
Tankegangen er på mange måder sympatisk, og hvis dette var den linje, den amerikanske invasions- og besættelsesmagt fra starten havde lagt, kunne meget have set anderledes - og bedre - ud i Irak i dag.

Og dog tror jeg ikke, Henderson har ret. Jeg tror, den noget smertefulde erkendelse er, at USA med deres invasion og besættelse ikke gør, har gjort eller vil kunne gøre noget som helst godt eller fornuftigt i Irak.

Så måske den eneste vej ud er, at USA erkender, at hele historien - for så vidt der overhovedet har været nogen intention om at "gøre godt" og ikke blot om at plyndre et usædvanligt olierigt land - har været en fejltagelse, doomed from the very beginning.

Vi taler med andre ord om Jarrar-planen:
1- Issue a Public Apology and hold responsibility for the destruction of Iraq and the murder or Iraqis.

2- Announce A Schedule For Complete Military Pullout From Iraq

3- Start fixing the mess caused by the war and occupation by both Paying Compensation And Bringing War Criminals To Justice
Det er formentlig ikke, hvad der kommer til at ske, og en amerikansk tilbagetrækning kan næppe (selvom den er et reelt ønske hos en meget stor del af den irakiske befolkning) gøres fra den ene dag til den næste.

Hvad angår det sidste punkt, erstatningen, elaborerer Jarrar i sit indlæg:
Iraq is paying 5% of its oil revenue since the early 1990s because of the unjustified war and occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Iraq should continue paying compensation to Kuwait and Kuwaitis because of the big mistake committed by Iraq, and the US-led coalition should pay compensation to Iraq and Iraqis because of the big mistake committed by the so called "coalition of the willing". "The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was created in 1991 as a subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council. Its mandate is to process claims and pay compensation for losses and damage suffered as a direct result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait". This committee should manage both the compensation to Kuwait and to Iraq. In addition, the war crimes committed by the US- led coalition won't be forgotten or forgiven by Iraqis, Arabs, and Muslims until all war criminals are brought to justice.
Og ret beset så manglede det vel bare: Snart tre års ulovlig og uberettiget invasion, krig og besættelse har påført landet kolossale lidelser og meget store materielle skader.

Men nogen egentlig militær eller politisk betydning i Irak bør USA nok besinde sig på, at de ikke kan have i længden. De fik ingen invitation til at komme, har ikke haft grund til at tro, de var for alvor velkomne, og de fleste irakere føler stadig, at deres tilstedeværelse i landet gør mere skade end gavn.

Om man fra starten havde fulgt den vej, Henderson lægger op til i sit indlæg, kunne meget som sagt have set anderledes ud i dag. Men stedet har man, som Henderson også skriver, soldater som render rundt
kicking in doors and conducting house to house searches, and putting American soldiers who have little cultural or language training, but are armed and outnumbered and afraid, in Saddam's former palaces, only to be seen when they walk or roll by on full alert, scanning every Iraqi face with trepidation. We have physical and sexual abuse of Iraqi prisoners, and we punish privates instead of generals and hope the Iraqis "get over it."
Mon tiden ikke er kommet til, at amerikanerne indser deres fejltagelse, og om ikke andet undskylder - overfor den irakiske befolkning, og overfor verden?

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